tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2081835178172740261.post4596277365157313345..comments2023-10-31T01:54:15.348-07:00Comments on Artificial Simplicity: Strategic enduranceskhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09147770743305509403noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2081835178172740261.post-60631328317845402192007-10-22T17:11:00.000-07:002007-10-22T17:11:00.000-07:00There's an interesting parallel to military strate...There's an interesting parallel to military strategy, at least as proposed and practiced by George C. Marshall. Most of the combatants in WW II, and especially the British and Germans, created incredibly detailed and plans that were rendered useless the moment battle was struck. They also conjured up complicated tactical plans that, once again, required every step to follow on course to ensure success.<BR/><BR/>Marshall, however, believed in the essential confusion in battle, albeit while also beliving you could anticipate this confusion, and plan to be flexible. While at the Infranty School at Fort Benning in the late 1920s, he helped formulate the concept of the holding attack - divide your force in three, use one third to advance and hold the enemy, while a second third probes for weakness on the flanks, and the last third remains as a reserve to either shore up the holding force, or to exploit any breakthough by the probing force. (there's a more complete descirption of this in Geoffry Perrett's We've got a War to Win.) This one strategy - and tactical plan informed virtually every U.S. engagement in WW II, from the platoon level up to Army Groups. That's focus.roberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08983664516272254919noreply@blogger.com